In L.G. v. New York City Department of Education, No. 23-CV-9268, 2023 WL 8044937, 123 LRP 33163 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023), the court applied stay-put principles to a situation in which no available placement conformed to the student’s individualized education program (IEP). The court granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring the district to fund the student’s parentally selected residential placement during the pendency of due process proceedings, or until the district offered an appropriate residential placement consistent with the IEP.

The student, a sixteen-year-old classified with an emotional disturbance, attended an IEP meeting on June 15, 2023, at which the parent and the district agreed that the student required a twelve-month placement in a nonpublic residential school. The court therefore treated the IEP’s recommendation of a nonpublic residential placement as the student’s last agreed-upon educational program for stay-put purposes.

Despite this agreement, none of the thirteen residential schools to which the district referred the student agreed to accept her. The district instead proposed an interim public school day placement. The parent rejected that option and unilaterally enrolled the student at Crossroads Academy, a private residential school. The parent then filed suit seeking preliminary relief requiring the district to fund the Crossroads placement during the pendency of the dispute or until a suitable residential placement became available.

The district opposed the motion on exhaustion grounds, arguing that the parent was required to complete administrative proceedings before seeking judicial relief. The court rejected that argument, explaining that alleged violations of the IDEA’s stay-put provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), fall outside the exhaustion requirement under controlling Second Circuit precedent.

The district also relied on Ventura de Paulino v. New York City Department of Education, 959 F.3d 519 (2d Cir. 2020), to argue that funding a unilateral parental placement was impermissible. The court disagreed, distinguishing Ventura de Paulino on the ground that, in that case, the district had offered an available placement consistent with the agreed-upon program, whereas here, no residential placement conforming to the IEP was available. The Second Circuit had expressly identified such circumstances as potential candidates for injunctive relief.

The court concluded that this case presented the type of extraordinary circumstances contemplated in Ventura de Paulino. Because the district failed to offer any available placement consistent with the IEP, the parent demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The court also found irreparable harm, noting that the parent could not afford the tuition and had borrowed funds to maintain the placement. Finally, the court held that the balance of equities and the public interest favored injunctive relief.

The decision underscores that when a district agrees that a residential placement is required but cannot identify an available school to implement that placement, stay-put may require funding of a parentally selected residential program during the pendency of due process proceedings.