In J.M. v. New York City Department of Education, 161 F.4th 149, 125 LRP 32414 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2025), the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of a class action challenging New York City’s alleged policy of discontinuing Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) services before students’ twenty-second birthdays, holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required under the circumstances presented.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory education relief on behalf of a class of students with disabilities, alleging that the New York City Department and Board of Education, along with the Chancellor in her official capacity, violated IDEA by ending services when students turned twenty-one rather than continuing through the end of their twenty-first year. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
On appeal, the Second Circuit first addressed the nature of IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Relying on recent Supreme Court authority requiring “unmistakable evidence” before treating an exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional, the court concluded that IDEA’s exhaustion provision is a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar. In reaching that conclusion, the court observed that several other circuits had already characterized IDEA exhaustion as nonjurisdictional and that the Second Circuit had previously left the issue unresolved.
The court then considered whether exhaustion should be excused. It explained that exhaustion may be excused where plaintiffs challenge a policy or practice of general applicability alleged to be contrary to law, an exception the court had recognized decades earlier. The court traced the exception to legislative history surrounding Congress’s response to Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), and enactment of the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796, emphasizing that the history informed the court’s approach to exhaustion rather than interpretation of statutory text.
Surveying decisions from other circuits, the court noted that exhaustion has been excused where claims present pure questions of law and administrative review would not advance the purposes of developing a factual record, applying agency expertise, or promoting efficiency. The Second Circuit reiterated that plaintiffs invoking the policy-or-practice exception must identify a specific policy of broad applicability and demonstrate that administrative proceedings would not meaningfully further those goals.
Applying that framework, the court concluded that the plaintiffs adequately identified an across-the-board policy of providing a free appropriate public education (FAPE) only until students turn twenty-one, rather than through their twenty-second birthday. The court further determined that requiring exhaustion would not serve the purposes of the exhaustion requirement because the central claim for declaratory relief was not tied to individual student circumstances, would not benefit from an administrative record, and did not require the exercise of educational discretion or expertise. The court declined to credit the defendants’ argument that individualized administrative proceedings could provide relief, concluding that the independent policy-or-practice ground was sufficient to excuse exhaustion.
The court emphasized that its decision did not resolve whether students are entitled to IDEA services through their twenty-second birthday, but instead addressed only the threshold exhaustion question. It vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
The decision reflects that IDEA’s exhaustion requirement functions as a claim-processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar and that exhaustion may be excused where plaintiffs mount a facial challenge to a broadly applicable policy and administrative proceedings would not advance the purposes underlying exhaustion.