In Ogunleye v. Banks, No. 23-cv-9524, 2025 WL 2050973, 125 LRP 21674 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-1994 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2025), the district court upheld a proposed public school program under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) over a parent’s challenge that the individualized education program (IEP) was impossible to implement because the volume of related services exceeded the length of the instructional day and week.
The student had significant medical and physical disabilities, including a seizure disorder, cerebral palsy, and cortical visual impairment, and was nonverbal and nonambulatory. The student attended a private school, iBrain, in a classroom of no more than six students with at least one licensed special education teacher and an additional teacher or paraprofessional, and received music therapy and other related services.
The school district convened a Committee on Special Education (CSE) meeting on March 30, 2022. The proposed IEP recommended a 12:1:4 classroom with a licensed special education teacher and four additional teachers or paraprofessionals, along with approximately nineteen hours per week of related services in addition to instructional time. The district later issued a school location letter identifying a proposed placement. The parent reported that she attempted to contact the school to arrange a visit but received no response. She then notified the district of her intent to unilaterally place the student at iBrain for the 2022–2023 school year and subsequently filed a due process complaint seeking tuition reimbursement.
The impartial hearing officer ruled in favor of the parent, but the state review officer (SRO) reversed, concluding that the district’s proposed program offered a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The district court affirmed, emphasizing that deference was owed to the SRO as the final administrative decisionmaker and finding the decision well reasoned and supported by the record.
The court agreed with the SRO that the staffing ratio in the proposed public classroom was comparable to that provided at iBrain and credited testimony that the student would receive individualized instruction and attention through the assignment of a personal paraprofessional. It rejected the parent’s argument that the IEP was mathematically impossible to implement, noting testimony from the school’s interim principal that the instructional week totaled approximately thirty hours and that some related services could be delivered within the classroom without displacing core instruction. The court characterized the parent’s contrary assertions as speculative.
The court also upheld the SRO’s conclusion that the absence of music therapy in the proposed placement did not deny FAPE. Although the student had received music therapy at iBrain, the record showed that the proposed placement offered music instruction and that skills addressed through music therapy could be targeted through other related services. The court further rejected claims that the 12:1:4 classroom reflected predetermination, citing testimony that multiple ratios were considered during the CSE meeting and that the final recommendation was made collaboratively. It also found no denial of parental participation, noting that the IEP incorporated recommendations from both iBrain and the parent.
The decision reflects that challenges to the feasibility of an IEP must be grounded in record evidence rather than speculation, that related services may be delivered flexibly within the instructional day, and that removal or substitution of a particular related service does not necessarily deny FAPE where the student’s needs can be addressed through other components of the program.