The stay-put provision of the IDEA, which requires that a child remain in his or her then-current educational placement during the pendency of proceedings unless the parties agree otherwise, can be difficult to apply when a placement ends for reasons unrelated to a school district’s decision. That issue was squarely addressed in Davis v. District of Columbia, 80 F.4th 321, 123 LRP 24587 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 2023), petition for cert. filed, No. 23-936 (Feb. 27, 2024).
The student in Davis had autism spectrum disorder and other conditions and exhibited aggressive behavior toward others, self-injury, and property destruction. He had been placed in a residential facility by the school district, but the facility unilaterally discharged him at the end of October 2021. The district asserted that it was unable to identify a replacement residential placement and instead offered in-home services or virtual services with a support aide in a high school classroom. At the same time, the district continued to search for a new residential setting, but the student was rejected by nineteen residential facilities.
Shortly before the residential facility discharged the student, the parent filed a due process complaint. After the discharge, the parent sought judicial relief, asking the district court to order the continuation of a residential placement or comparable services under the IDEA’s stay-put provision. The district court denied the request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
The court of appeals affirmed. It concluded that the stay-put mandate did not apply because the District of Columbia had not effectuated a fundamental change in the student’s educational placement by attempting to alter or undo the services required by the IEP. 80 F.4th at 326. Instead, the residential component of the IEP became unavailable for reasons outside the district’s control. Id. at 327. The court emphasized the district court’s finding that the district had conducted a thorough and ongoing search for an appropriate placement.
The court further explained that even if the stay-put provision were triggered, relief would still be unavailable. Section 1415(j) contemplates maintaining a then-current placement, but “a student cannot remain in an unavailable placement.” Id. at 328. Under the circumstances presented, the statute did not require the district to create an alternative placement to replace the one that no longer existed.
The court noted, however, that the denial of stay-put relief did not foreclose other forms of judicial intervention. It left open the possibility that a court could grant injunctive relief under traditional equitable standards rather than through the automatic operation of the stay-put provision. The court also observed that if an administrative hearing officer or a court ultimately determined that the district failed to provide a free appropriate public education, compensatory education or retroactive reimbursement could be warranted. Id. at 330.
Taken together, the decision reflects that stay-put operates to preserve an existing placement, not to require districts to recreate one that has become unavailable through circumstances beyond their control.