In Pierre-Noel v. Bridges Public Charter School, 113 F.4th 970, 124 LRP 32461 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 2024), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires door-to-door transportation for a medically fragile student with significant mobility limitations, and whether the dispute was moot. The court reversed the district court and held that IDEA required transportation from the student’s apartment door so the student could attend school in person.
The case involved an eight-year-old student with multiple disabilities who uses a wheelchair for mobility and depends on a tracheostomy tube to breathe and a gastrostomy tube for nutrition and medication. Considered medically fragile, the student requires one-to-one nursing support and uses multiple medical and assistive devices. After attending school remotely in earlier years, the student was set to begin first grade in person. His mother requested transportation from the door of the family’s walk-up apartment to the vehicle transporting him to school.
The District of Columbia denied the request, relying on policies limiting transportation to the outermost door of a student’s residence and prohibiting lifting or carrying students. The student’s mother filed a due process complaint. The hearing officer denied the requested relief but ordered transportation to and from the outermost door of the apartment building. The district court granted summary judgment for the District and the charter school.
A unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed. The court first addressed mootness, noting that the student was no longer enrolled at the charter school and therefore the claims against that entity were moot. As to the District of Columbia, however, the court concluded that the case remained live because it was capable of repetition yet evading review. The District had again refused to provide apartment-door transportation after the student re-enrolled in public school, creating a reasonable likelihood of recurring harm.
On the merits, the court rejected the District’s argument that the IDEA did not provide sufficiently clear notice that door-to-door transportation could be required. Relying on Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295–96 (2006), the court explained that the relevant inquiry is whether the funding recipient has clear notice of the obligation to provide transportation, not whether it can anticipate every factual scenario the obligation may encompass.
Applying the statutory text, the court emphasized that IDEA defines transportation as a related service “as may be required to assist a child . . . to benefit from special education,” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). The court concluded that this language is not limited to vehicular transportation and that a child living in a walk-up apartment accessible only by stairs is a common circumstance well within Congress’s contemplation. The court also relied on the breadth of educational settings contemplated by IDEA, the statute’s least restrictive environment requirement, and the definition of transportation at 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(16).
The court noted that its holding was consistent with an earlier District of Columbia decision requiring apartment-door transportation, District of Columbia v. Ramirez, 377 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2005).
The decision reflects that IDEA’s transportation obligation is defined by what is necessary for a student to access education in light of individual needs, and that disputes over access-related services may remain justiciable where the challenged conduct is likely to recur.